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Abstract
Some contracts (academic employment, for instance) carry voting rights on some issues and
other contracts do not (health club memberships). Voting is one way of resolving
noncontractible uncertainty; dictatorship is another. Majority rule resolves noncontractible
uncertainty efficiently for issues where all players' stakes are expected to be about the same;
dictatorship is efficient when one player's stake is much higher than any other players'. In
general, weighted voting schemes where weights depend positively on expected stake and
negatively on expected benefits are efficient when players' benefits are independent; the quota
required is larger the lower are expected social benefits. Correlation modifies these results;
minorities, for instance, have votes that count more under some circumstances. I apply this
method to representative government and municipal governance.
I. Introduction
People often negotiate contracts that give them voting rights. Investors in a firm get to sit
on the board of directors or to participate in shareholder elections; professors, as part of their
employment contracts, vote in department and faculty meetings; towns, when they join together
to operate a joint sewer or library system, get votes on the board that runs that system; workers,
when they join a union, acquire voting rights in union elections. Partners in law firms, members
of clubs and learned societies, cooperative apartment owners and condominium association
members all enter into contracts that give them some type of voting rights. So too do purchasers
of owner-occupied housing and residential tenants ~ their purchase contracts and leases give
them the right to vote in local elections. So too do students ~ paying tuition gets them votes in
student association and later alumni association elections.
Not all contracts carry voting rights, of course. Buying a soda does not entitle you to vote
in any election (although buying a token used to let you vote in the Miss NYC Subway contest);
nor does going to a physician. Some apartment buildings are co-ops, but most are privately
owned ~ their tenancy contracts carry no voting rights. Health clubs sell "memberships," but
members never vote on anything. Law firm associates (and even some partners) vote on nothing;
nor do staff members in academic departments.
Why do some contracts include voting rights while others do not? Why do the voting
rights take the form that they do? These are the two chief questions that this paper is intended to
address.
I try to answer these questions by drawing on two observations. The first is that the
issues on which voting takes place must have been in some sense non-contractible at the time the
contract was signed; otherwise the results of the vote could have been included in the contract
without the charade of an election. Elections are about issues where the benefits that contractors
receive depend on unverifiable events that occur after the contract is signed ~ for if the
intervening events were verifiable the election outcome, contingent on these events, could have
been included in the contract. For instance, a cooperative apartment building does not need to
vote on keeping the temperature above 65° in the winter because "temperature will be above 65°
in the winter" can be written into the contract and enforced in a court of law (especially in a city
with a corps of housing inspectors with certified thermometers). But installing a new boiler
might well be subject to a vote, since the original contract could not have specified very precisely
the conditions under which new boiler installation would be done ~ how often repairs had to be
done to the old one, what kind of repairs, how much those repairs cost, how residents felt at
various temperatures, how their children and pets felt, how much they liked going to
neighborhood bars or gyms when their apartments were cold, what new technologies were
available, what new construction had obscured the sun in various parts of the building.
Similarly, if faculty members have strong feelings about something verifiable — hiring
left-handed time series econometricians, for instance ~ these can be written into their
employment contracts. A university might agree never to hire a left-handed time series
econometrician; then it would raise and lower salaries appropriately and there would be no need
for a vote. But "hiring interesting and personable colleagues" cannot be written into anyone's
contract, and so is a possible subject for voting.
The second observation is that contracts circumscribe the issues over which voting can
take place. The Columbia Economics department cannot vote people into the Rock and Roll
Hall of Fame; nor can the St. Joseph's parish council decide Italy's policy in the Balkans. Even
for their own members' activities the powers of most polities are tightly limited: its shareholders
do not expect AT&T to tell them what sexual practices to follow, or even what telephones to
buy. Such limited authority is, of course, expected in a contract entered into voluntarily.
To be sure, the limits on the issues over which voting is allowed are often fuzzy. Part of
the reason for this is that the issues are noncontractible, and so may be difficult even to describe
when the contract is written. But while the limits may be fuzzy, they still are limits: although it
may be ambiguous whether the economics department can require unionized staff members to
begin and end work a half hour early, it clearly cannot induct performers into the Rock and Roll
Hall of Fame.
These two considerations lead to the approach we take. We think of an issue as a random
vector of net benefits. The job of a contract is to specify the population from which this vector
will be drawn, and once it is drawn, the procedure that will be used either to approve or reject it.
If the issue is approved, people realize the vector of net benefits. If it is rejected, nothing
happens.
What procedures are efficient, then, depends on the probability distribution function for
net benefit vectors. The first section of the paper considers this question when the net benefit
vector distribution has two properties that we call conditional symmetry and conditional
independence. These properties are weaker than the well-known "unconditional" properties with
the same names. These properties give us some very strong results.
First, whether a set of noncontractible issues should be decided by a vote and, if they
should be, who should vote, depends on the variances of potential voters' net benefits. If one
person has a variance of net benefits much larger than everyone else's — that is, if she cares about
a set of noncontractible issues a lot more than everyone else ~ then she should be the dictator for
that set. Other people may care about what I say about Bosnia, but I care a lot more about what I
say than they do, and so voting on my speaking would be inefficient. More generally, if it is
efficient for a group of people to vote on a set of issues, then their net benefit variances are not
"too dissimilar." We give an explicit condition on maximal diversity. We show, moreover, that
people who care enough about issues to be voters also care enough to be incorruptible.
Our emphasis in homogeneity in a group of voters echoes Hansmann [1988], a paper that
has goals very similar to ours. One way to look at this paper is as a formalization of Hansmann.
The second result about conditionally symmetric, conditionally independent sets of issues
is that weighted majority rule, with some set of voters, is the only efficient procedure
(dictatorship is majority rule with one voter).
The next sections of the paper show what happens when sets of issues are either not
conditionally symmetric, not conditionally independent, or both. The weighted majority rule
result requires conditional symmetry. The homogeneity results are fairly robust, however, and
when weighted voting is optimal, it is the voters with the largest variances and smallest means
relative to standard error whose votes count the most.
Conditional independence is a more significant restriction than conditional symmetry,
and the sections on relaxing the conditional independence assumption work much harder to
achieve more meager results than the sections on relaxing conditional symmetry do. Several new
problems are introduced, most seriously some failures of incentive compatibility. I show that
with equicorrelation and identical players, majority rule is still the optimal mechanism, provided
correlation is not too great, and that when different players have different variances, players with
greater variances will count for more. I also show that minority groups should have votes that
count for more than majority groups, all else being equal, and that representative government is
under some circumstances better than direct majority rule.
Finally, to illustrate the power of this approach, we study the governance of metropolitan
areas. Metropolitan areas can have either bunches of small town governments (the Tiebout
approach, popular with economists), a single large unified government (the metropolitan
approach, often popular with political scientists and public administration experts), or a
combination of small towns and special districts (an approach currently receiving great attention
in Europe). We show the conditions under which autonomous governments (possibly with
simple ~ nonvoting ~ contracts with suppliers of pencils, firetrucks, and water) are optimal,
when unified government is optimal, and when special districts are optimal.
Some readers may think it strange that a paper about contracts should also attempt to
assess the optimality of different forms of government. Contractarians ~ people who think of
constitutions as contracts ~ would, of course, find nothing strange in this attempt, but
contractarianism is not a necessary condition for seeing the application of these results to
governments. The subject of this paper is the efficient resolution of noncontractible uncertainty,
and this is a problem that should concern governments and designers of governments as well as
private parties.
II. Conditionally Independent and Conditionally Symmetrical Sets of Issues
A. Notation
Denote the set of people affected by a contract (or constitution) by N={l,...,n} with a
generic element i and denote this set's power set Pn. An issue is an n-vector (6,)M,...,n of net
benefits. If the issue is approved, each player / receives b,; if not, she receives zero.
A set of issues is a probability distribution f:
f:R"-+ [0,1]
over /7-dimensional space; it assigns each issue a probability. Let b_, denote the




for all b.h bh and /.
Notice that independence implies conditional independence, but not the converse. A set
of issues has the property of conditional symmetry if
E(bi\bi<0) = -E(bi\b>0).
Symmetry around zero implies conditional symmetry, but not the converse. An elliptical
multivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and no covariance, for instance, has
conditional independence and conditional symmetry, since it has both independence and
symmetry around zero. For another example, consider any nonnegative ^-vector (c;). For all /, if
f(b)>0
only if either bi=ci or b,~ -ch then the set of issues has both conditional independence and •
conditional symmetry, although it need not have either independence or symmetry around zero.
We refer to such a set of issues as a two-point distribution.
If f() is a conditionally independent, conditionally symmetric set of issues, we will
abbreviate
E(bl\b>O) = ar
Thus in the elliptical multivariate normal distribution
at - ^ Gi
(Patel and Read, 1982, p.34)
and in the two-point distribution
a, = c,
B. Optimal Procedures
First suppose n=3; there are only three people. Assume w.l.o.g. ax > a2> a3. Suppose that
the only information the procedure can use is whether or not a particular issue's net benefits are
negative or nonnegative for each person; we will justify this assumption shortly. Then a
procedure is a mapping
z:P(n)-*[09l]
that assigns to every set of people with positive net benefits a probability that the issue will be









Let pj denote the probability that/ will be the set of people with positive net benefits:
P r \ . . . J f(b) db.
isj bf>0
i <£j bj <0
Assumep>0 for ally.
Let Zj denote the probability that the issue will be approved if only the people in set/ have
positive net benefits. Let Sj denote the expected sum of benefits if the people in/ are the only
ones with positive net benefits. Thus for instance
Sx = E(bx+b2+b31 Z>!>0, b2>0, Z>3>0)
= E(bx | bx>Qi)+E(b21 b2>0)+E(b31 Z>3>0)
= ax+a2+a3
and
iSr2=a1+a2-flr3, and so on.
Notice that this formulation allows many different voting rules. For instance
zx=z2=z3=z5=\, and z4=z6=z7=z8=0 is dictatorship by person 1; z\ = Z2 = zz - z$ = | ,




A procedure z is efficient if for all z\
S(z')<S(z).
It is easy to see that a procedure is efficient if and only if
zf=\
zj=O ifS<0.
So to find an efficient procedure, we need only find which Sj are positive. For the case of n=3,
this is easy
S\ = a\ +ct2 +CI3 > 0
S3 = a\ -ci2 +CI2 > 0
57 = -a\ - ai + 03 = -S2 < 0
Ss=-S{ <0,
and the only ambiguous sums are S4 and S5
54 = —a\ + ci2 + cii
55 —Cl\ -CI2-CI3 = -1S4
Thus if
(1) fl2+fl3>fl1,
then SA>0, S5<0 and majority rule is the efficient procedure. If
a1+aj<al
then dictatorship by person 1 is efficient. If (1) holds, players 2 and 3 "care enough" about this
set of issues that it makes sense for them to vote. Alternatively, they care enough that what they
are willing to pay to gain the right to vote is more than enough to compensate player 1 for the
loss of her dictatorship. The expected loss for player 1 in going from dictatorship to majority
rule is
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and the expected gain to players 2 and 3 is
p,(a2+a2) -p5(-a2-a3) = (p4+p5)(a2+a3)
and (1) states that the gain exceeds the loss.
Notice that only relative at matter; so we can set ax=\ w.l.o.g.
What happens if there are 5 players instead of 3? Several new phenomena emerge. For
simplicity, let a2=a3 and a4=a5, with, as usual l=ol >a2 >a4. Figure 1 summarizes the
possibilities
The only relevant cases are those where a2< 1 and aA<a2. If the parameters lie in region A or in
region C, the optimal mechanism is familiar. In region A, at is about the same for all / ~
everyone cares about as much on this set of issues « and so majority rule with all five voting is
the optimal procedure. In region C, player 1 cares a lot more than the others do, and so she
should be the dictator.
Region B is somewhat familiar also. Players 2 and 3 care a lot but players 4 and 5 care
little. The optimal procedure in this region is majority rule, but with players 4 and 5 excluded.
Regions D and E introduce new kinds of mechanisms. In region D, player 1 is almost a
dictator. She can do what she wants unless the others vote unanimously against her. Region E is
more complicated: if player 1 supports an issue it wins if either one of players 2 and 3, or both of
players 4 and 5 also support it. If player 1 opposes an issue, it wins if both 2 and 3 and at least
one of players 4 and 5 also support it. Another way to describe this mechanism is that a proposal





majority vote and 1 agrees with this majority, the proposal wins. If player 1 is on the losing side
of the committee, a majority vote of all five players decides the issue. Otherwise the proposal
fails.
A third and final way to think about the optimal procedure for region E is as a weighted
voting scheme: player 1 has 3 votes, players 2 and 3 have 2 votes each, players 4 and 5 have 1
vote each, and a simple majority (5) of the 9 total votes is required for an issue to win.
Indeed, each of the five optimal schemes can be represented as a type of weighted
majority rule. For instance, in region A everyone has one vote; in region B, players 1, 2 and 3
each have one vote and players 4 and 5 have none; in region C, player 1 has one vote and no one
else has any; and in region D, player 1 has 7 votes and everyone else has two. Such schemes, of
course, are not unique. It can be shown that if the vector (a) is in a particular region and the
vector (a') is in the same region and y>0, then majority rule with the weighting scheme (y a') is
an optimal mechanism.
We can generalize most of these results. Let n be odd.
First, weighted majority rule. A weighted voting scheme is a vector (w,q) in Rl x R+. A
weighted majority rule voting scheme is a weighted voting scheme with
n
A weighted voting scheme (w,q) represents a mechanism z iff
(1) wheneverz,=1, S w / > ^
isj
(2) whenever z/=0, E w , < ^
(3) whenever z, £(0,1) £ wt•• = q .
izj
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Clearly, if (w, q) represents z, so does ( yw, yg) where y>0.
Proposition 1: Consider a set of issues that has conditional independence and conditional
symmetry. If z is an optimal mechanism then z can be represented by a weighted majority rule
voting scheme.
Proof: Consider the following weighted voting scheme
w, = a{ for all i
Obviously this is a weighted majority rule voting scheme.
Suppose z is an optimal mechanism.
IfzM, then 5,^0. That is






Similarly for z/=0 and 0<z;<l.
QED
Corollary 1: Suppose z is an optimal mechanism both for the parameters (a) and (a1). Then
(ya(, | yZ at) represents an optimal mechanism for parameters (a).
Thus since the point ax = - = a5 = 1 is in region A in figure 1, unweighted majority rule
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(w = ... =
 Ws =1) represents the optimal mechanism for any parameters in region A.
Corollary 2: (Mechanism-Symmetry Result) If z is an optimal mechanism, then for ally, either
Sj=0 or Zj zN/j = 0
The results of Taylor (1969) and Rae (1969) are a special case of proposition 1.
We can also derive some necessary conditions (and one sufficient one) for various simple
mechanisms to be optimal. Assume ax = 1 > a2 > •• > an.
Define m-majority rule. m<nas the mechanism represented by the weighted-majority
rule voting scheme with
wj = - = wm = 1, wm+l = - = wn = 0.




Proof: Necessity. Lety = {^ y-, —• + 1,...,«}. Since [/1 = *y- , n-majority rule requires that the
issue win if the players inj and only the players iny favor it. So Sj>0 is necessary. But S7>0 is
equivalent to (2).
Sufficiency. Suppose (2) holds. Then W^>q, using the weighting scheme from the proof
of proposition 1. Let k be any other majority. Then Wk> Wj since k has either more members' than
j , or it is formed fromy by substituting a player with greater weight. Hence Wk> Wp>q and so
Sk>Q and zk=\, too. But then Swk<0 and so zwk=0. So z is ^-majority rule.
QED
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Proposition 2: A necessary condition for n-majority rule to be an optimal mechanism is
an-\ +an>\.














and so (3) is a contradiction.
QED
Proposition 3: Two necessary conditions for m-majority rule to be an optimal mechanism are
/7__ 4- /7_, 1 > 1
*•*/« ' l-*in—i — x
®m+\ ' @m+2 ^ Clm+\
2
Proof: Lety = {^-,2y- + l , . . . ,w}. Since j contains a majority of the first m players, Sj> 0 is a
necessary condition for m-majority rule to be an optimal mechanism. Hence







Since 2 a, > 0, and 2 tf; > 2 a/, it follows from the same reasoning as in the proofi=m+\ i-2 ;=2±I
2
of proposition 2 that
am-\ +am>\.
Next, consider the set k = {-^, - ^ + 1,..., w, m + 1, m + 2}. This set does not contain a
majority of the first m players, and so if m-majority rule is an optimal mechanism, Sk< 0. Hence
m+2 m 2 n
S flj: = S cii -a>m± + am+\ + am+2 < 1 + 2 a,•+ Z a,
'~ 2 2
2 1




m 2 « T "1
2 fl,<l+Ia(+ 2 a,- + 2 a«2ii - am+i - am+2 .
-mil 2 i=m+l L 2 J2
Comparing this with (4), we see that a necessary condition for m-majority rule to be optimal is
dual - t f m + l -<2m+2 ^ 0 .
2
QED.
Propositions 2 and 3, then, formalize Hansmann's notion that a degree of similarity
among voters is needed for majority rule voting to be a good procedure.
C. Dissembling. Collusion, and Competition
The preceding results are about mechanisms where the only information that voters report
is whether they are for or against the issue, where they report this information sincerely, and
where they do not collude. There are compelling reasons for each of these restrictions.
The first two restrictions work together and grow out of a more basic restriction. The
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mechanisms I consider are one-dimensional: the only thing they specify is a probability that the
issue wins; they do not, for instance, specify in addition a vector of payments to each of the
players.
Why not? Because, as Green and Laffont [1979] have shown, no mechanism that uses
payments to players can elicit true preferences from players without violating budget balance
conditions. If a group of players like the one we are considering used a Groves-Clarke
mechanism (Groves [1973], Clarke [1971]), for instance, they would either need an external
source of finance or have to be willing to throw money away. True, the mechanisms we consider
do not achieve the level of welfare a budget-balanced mechanism with full truthful revelation
would achieve, either, but no such mechanism exists. Whether these mechanisms perform better
than a Groves-Clarke mechanism somehow modified to maintain budget balance is an open
question worthy of much deeper study. In the meantime, the popularity of voting schemes and
the unpopularity of Groves-Clarke mechanisms leads me to believe that voting schemes perform
better.
Since the mechanisms we study are one-dimensional, incentive-compatibility requires
that they elicit no more information from voters than whether they favor or oppose the issue
(wimpy ways of voting would not be used). Obviously sincere voting in this context is
incentive-compatible.
Noncontractibility also presents problems for ex post collusion. The most fruitful type of
collusion would be for all voters to vote yes if and only if the sum of net benefits was positive (or
for some weighted majority coalition to do so with respect to its sum of net benefits). If net
benefits are private information, such behavior is impossible. If net benefits are observable and
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verifiable, then a rule like this can be written into the contract. If net benefits are observable but
not verifiable, then collusion can be sustained only by repetition. We defer to subsequent papers
the study of this sort of collusion. For now, think of a single issue being decided.
What about ex ante bribery? We can show that the same conditions that make a
mechanism optimal protect it against ex ante bribery. An example suffices. Return to the case of
n=3 and suppose
a}<a2+ci3
so that simple majority rule is optimal. Suppose player 1 proposes to player 2 ex ante: "Vote
with me always and I'll pay you." If player 2 agrees to this deal, player 1 becomes the dictator.
Thus player l's gain from the deal and the maximum he would be willing to pay is
The combined loss for players 2 and 3, though, is
and so player 3 would be willing to pay enough to counter-bribe player 2 that the deal could not
work. If players care enough about the issues to be voters in an optimal procedure, they care
enough to be incorruptible.
D. Even numbers
If n is even, /i-majority rule is never optimal, unless ax=an. Either the last voter is entirely
excluded, or some proper subset of voters receives special privileges. It is easiest to see why in
the case n=2. If ax>a2, then player 1 has to be the dictator.
The case n=4 is slightly more sophisticated; there are three possibilities. If
a\ > ai +#3 +«4
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then player 1 is a dictator. If not, and
CL\ +<?4 > #2 + # 3 ,
then an issue wins if it is supported two voters, including player 1, or all three other voters. If
a\ +ci4 <ai+ai,
the optimal mechanism is 3-majority rule.
III. Conditionally Independent Sets of Issues
A. General
The assumption of conditional symmetry can be relaxed with only small changes in the
previous results. For any conditionally independent set of issues and all players /', define
(5a) mt = \lEipt\bi > O)+E(bi\bi < 0)]
(5b) at = \lEQ>i\bt > 0)-E(bi\b, < 0)],
and so
E(bi\bj <0) = mj-ai
Thus mt plays a role like the one zero played with conditionally symmetric distributions.
n
LetM= E /Hi.
Note that the players together receive a total of Min addition to the positive or negative
a/s whenever the issue wins; this is independent of who votes. For any set of playersy,
izj isN/J
which is the same as the value of Sj in the previous section, except that Mhas been added. So the
size ordering of Sj is the same as it was in the previous section - the ordering depends only on
the a, — but the division between the sets for which S, is positive and those for which it is
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negative has been changed. If M>0, some sets that were previously not sufficient for the issue to
win may now be sufficient; if M<0, some sets that were sufficient before may not be now. With
negative M, there is a presumption that issues are bad things and should win only with great
support. With positive M, the presumption is the opposite.
Proposition 4 formalizes this idea:
Proposition 4: Consider a set of issues that has conditional independence. Any optimal
mechanism can be represented by a weighted voting scheme (w, q) where
w, = a,
and
Proof: Same as proposition 1, but with the new formula for Sj.
The variances determine the weights; the midpoints determine the standard.
Notice that the Coase theorem is a special case of Proposition 4. Suppose there is no
noncontractible uncertainty; so aj= 0 for all /. Then no one votes and if M>0 the contract
specifies that the issue wins; if M<0 the contract specifies that the issue loses.
Some examples of how midpoints make a difference can be seen in land use law.
Consider the owner of undeveloped land, 1, and two neighbors, 2 and 3. An issue is an
opportunity to build on the vacant land ~ a proposal a developer makes. Assume ax > a2 + cr3.
Then if proposals are "on average" as likely to be good as to be bad ~ M— 0 ~ the optimal
mechanism makes player 1 a dictator: she builds if and only if the developer's proposal benefits
her. So for this class of proposals she can build "as of right." Consider, however, proposals that
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are often obnoxious ~ say, gasoline stations in residential districts. If
a2 - ax - a3 < M < a2 - a{ + a3 < 0,
then the optimal procedure is for the development to move forward if and only if player 1 wants
it, and so does a majority of the community. This is a stylized version of a zoning variance or a
conditional use. If the use is even more obnoxious,
the optimal mechanism bans development always. Thus an optimal land use ordinance for a
residential district might state that some uses (houses, for instance) can be built as of right; others
(gas stations) require variances; and those that are generally most noxious (nuclear testing sites)
are prohibited altogether.
Something like the zoning variance mechanism may also be at work in the Congressional
committee system. Suppose that representatives of farm states generally care a lot more than
other representatives about agricultural price support legislation and that proposals for such
legislation often fail cost-benefit analysis tests (so M< 0). Then the optimal procedure for
agricultural price support legislation is to refer it to a committee of farm state representatives
first, and to approve it only with the support of that committee and of the whole Congress.
Similarly, the New Jersey constitution specifies that "home rule initiatives" ~ better known as
"fat cop bills" ~ require the endorsement of a municipality's governing body before the
legislature considers them.
B. Multivariate Normal Distributions
Elliptical multivariate normal distributions ~ multivariate normal distributions with
diagonal variance-covariance matrices ~ are an important special case of Proposition 4.
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Suppose the set of issues is elliptical multivariate normal with mean vector (//£,),
 =1... „ and
variance vector (O,)i={...n. Let
Xi = 57 for all i.
Then
E(b,\b,<0)= M-OtKi-xMxd
where K(t) is the expectation of a standard normal distribution truncated from below at t, and
r(t\ - ^
where <£(?) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. It is easy to show that K{t) > 0,
r ' (0<0,and KO)=1-
From (5),
m \3 + [l r(xi)]OK(X)
This implies the following corollary to proposition 4:
Corollary 3: Suppose the set of issues has an elliptical multivariate normal distribution. An
optimal procedure can be represented by a weighted voting scheme (w, q) with
for all i, and
q = T,[r(xi)GiK(-Xi) - \it]
where M( •) is the Mills ratio.
Notice that weights are a function of JC, and Ot alone; / / , does not enter directly except in
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the quota. As before, higher variance implies greater weight, but what is the effect of x, ?
Since greater xt increases both O(x,) and A/(xy) the answer is unambiguous: greater x,
implies smaller weight. The less surprising it is that someone favors an average issue, the less
weight his or her affirmative vote should carry. The ex ante knowledge that a person is likely to
have a large benefit from the average issue is available when the contract is written and should be
reflected in a low threshhold for acceptance.
IV. Multivariate Normal Sets of Issues without Conditional Independence
To see why conditional independence is crucial for the results in the preceding sections,
consider the following example. There are three players, and the set of issues has a support with
only two elements. Either (a) the net benefits are (+4) for player 1 and (-1) each for players 2
and 3; or (b) the net benefits are (+2) for player 1, (-30) for player 2 and (+1) for player 4. So
social net benefits are positive for issue (a), negative for issue (b). We would want a mechanism
that approves issue (a) and rejects issue (b).
But we cannot construct a binary incentive-compatible mechanism that does so. Only
player 3 has differing positions on the two issues ~ player 1 supports both and player 2 opposes
both. So any mechanism that approved one issue and rejected the other would have to pay some
attention to player 3's support or opposition. In order to approve (a) and reject (b), however, the
mechanism would have to approve when player 3 was opposed and reject when he was in favor,
and so would not be incentive - compatible.
An optimal incentive-compatible, binary mechanism for this set of issues, therefore, must
either reject or accept all issues ex ante, without reference to any kind of discretion when the
players learn what issue is before them. If issue (a) is sufficiently probable, the mechanism
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approves all issues; if not, it rejects all issues.
To talk about problems like those presented by this example, we will define a condition
called "monotonicity." As before, let
Sj = E(t bi\{\/izj)bi > 0 and (Vkej)bk < 0)
/=i
denote the expected value of total benefits when only the players in set j have positive benefits.
A set of issues is strongly monotonic if
whenever h czj. A set of issues is weakly monotonic if whenever hczj and Sh > 0, Sj > 0; and
wheneveryc g and Sg < 0, Sj < 0. Clearly strong monotonicity implies weak and the example
has neither kind. Conditional independence implies strong monotonicity.
With multivariate normal distributions, monotonicity will be closely related to an
n-vector we call v = (v,). Define v, as the unconditional expected increase in social benefit when
player z's benefit increases by one standard error; that is
Not surprisingly, with conditional independence, vt = Ot. In various places in this
section, we will have to assume that v> 0 for all /.
Call a mechanism z "first-best optimal" if z7 = 1 if and only if Sj> 0. The optimal
mechanisms that we have studied heretofore were first-best optimal, but the example showed that
it is possible for no incentive-compatible mechanism to be first-best optimal. Clearly, weak
monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for a first-best optimal mechanism to be
incentive-compatible. We wish to continue studying first-best optimal mechanisms, and it will
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be clear in several places that vt > 0 for all i is necessary for the first-best optimal mechanism to
be incentive-compatible.
The first part of this section will be devoted to finding a general expression for Sr This is
needed, obviously, for finding first-best optimal mechanisms. General weighted vote formulas
like those in propositions 3 and 4 do not exist without conditional independence, and so the next
three parts concentrate on special cases: only three players, equicorrelation, and equicorrelation
within independent groups. The final part discusses representative government.
A. General expression
Suppose the set of issues is multivariate normal with mean vector 0 and
variance-covariance matrix ORO, where
CTI 0 ••• 0
0 CT2 :
a =
 ; ••. o
0 ••• 0 a*
and
1 P12 ••• P i«
pi* 1
is a self-adjoint positive matrix. Sometimes we will write p/; = 1.
From the linear regression property of the multivariate normal distribution
n
 a n
v,- = a, Z ^pm = S p/*a*.
k=l k=\
For anyy e P(ri), let (5, denote the orthant in which bt > 0 for all iej and bk < 0 for all k
<£ j . We will call (57- "the orthant of/." Let $g denote the projection of this orthant on the
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subspace formed by removing player z's benefits; that is, >y is the orthant of Rn.{ where for k * i,
bk> 0 for k ej and bk < 0 for k <£ j .
We assume Pr(beQj) > 0 for ally, and so
S* =Pr(be&J)SJ
has the same sign as Sj. It will be easier for us to work with S* in this part rather than 5^ -.
To find Sf we form the "moment-generating" function mff). Let u denote the n-vector
consisting solely of one's. Then
m{i)=Pr(betyE(etu/b
beOj




To change variable in the integral, let
B = b-taRcni,
which implies
Bt = bt - tGjVi
Then
mjv) -
Differentiating with respect to / we obtain
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S* = mj(O) = S OiViQ'j - 2 akvkQl
iej 7 kej J
where
Q;= j 4>fl(o,M<fc-.-
and (()„(•) is the n-variate pdf with parameters (0, ORO).
We can simplify further. The expression 0*. is the probability that 6, = 0 and b is in
Thus
Since the marginal distribution of a multivariate normal distribution is normal,
Moreover, from standard formulas (e.g., Johnson and Kotz 1972, p. 41), the conditional joint
distribution of b_, given b, = 0 is (n - 1) - variate normal with mean vector 0 and
variance-covariance matrix (ORQ) with row / and column / deleted. Denote this matrix
(G.,R.,G.,)- Hence
Pr(b in &J\bi=0)=Pr(b.i in 5 fJ)
S \ \= J (27r)--|^_ /|"|a|exp[-|(6- /a:,1) /i?_ /^_ /a:;)]^
= J (2ny"T\R-ir2Qxp[-^B/R-iB]dBkQij(R-i).
where the last step uses the substitution B = bO'1. Thus we finally have
(6) S* = {XviQyiR-i)- E ^
ij kijiej kij
27
If the mechanism that approves any issue if and only if the sety of its supporters has S* > 0 is
incentive-compatible, then that mechanism is optimal. This is the same result we have used
previously. But since the weight attached to v, differs in different sets, we cannot always
represent first-best optimal mechanisms with weighted voting schemes, or even describe them
simply. For this reason, we turn now to three special cases.
B. Three Players
The complications in expression (6) come from the weights Q^R.,). The case of three
players is easy because those weights take a simple form. Since n = 3, the matrix 7?_, is ( 2 x 2 ) ,
and so it contains only one off-diagonal correlation. The probability flyC) is m e probability that
a pair of benefits will lie in a particular quadrant of two-dimensional space; it is derived from a
standard bivariate normal distribution. But with a standard bivariate normal distribution, if you
know the probability that a pair lies in the first quadrant, you know the probability that it lies in
each other quadrant. The probability for the second quadrant and the first add to one-half, the
probability in the third quadrant is the same as that in the first, and the probability in the fourth
quadrant is the same as that in the second. The probability for the first quadrant, moreover, is an
increasing function of the correlation alone.
To be specific, let T(p) denote the probability in the first quadrant when two variables
have a standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation p:
T(p)= ft ft ^SBVN(x\,x2\p)dxidx2
where 4>SBVN (' I p) is m e standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation p. T(p) is an
increasing function of p; it approaches zero as p approaches (-1); it approaches (V2) as p
approaches (+1); and 71(0) = V4 .
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As before, let the first set be N = {1, 2, 3}. Then
(7) 5F; = (27t)-2{v,r(p23)+v2r(p,3)+v3r(p12)},
since for all i, T/7 is the positive quadrant. Let the second set be {1,2}
from comparison with (7). Similarly
Thus we see that if | j | = 2, the quota is 2-S*.
The other four sets in P(3) are merely reflections of these four: £5 = -S\; S*6 = -Si;
Sj = -Si; Si = -S*i . So the quota when \J\ = 1 is not S\, but (V- 2S\) , since, for instance for
^ 5
Ss=S\- j(vi + v2) > 0 if and only if vi > (V-2S\).
Thus even in the case of three players, the optimal first-best mechanism cannot be
represented by a weighted voting scheme; the "quota" for each set varies with the number of
elements in that set. Many of the same conclusions that we reached for conditional independence
still hold, however, provided that the first-best optimal mechanism is incentive-compatible.
Consider the conditions for dictatorship, for instance. Player 1 should be a dictator if
l - 2 7 f r i 3 ) 1-27XP12)
1 z
 271(p23) J 271[p23)
Thus larger G, still argues for player 1 to be dictator, provided p13 and p12 are not too large, but
the relationship is much more complex.
29
The first-best optimal mechanism, however, may not be incentive-compatible. Incentive
compatibility can fail if the correlations are either too high or too low. If some correlation is too
low, some v, can be negative; that player's votes would count negatively in the first-best optimal
mechanism, and so she would be inclined to lie.
The problem with high correlations is more subtle. Compare the sets {1} and {1,2}, and
suppose S* for the first set is positive; that is v, is larger than the quota for sets of size one.
Weak monotonicity requires that (v, + v2) be larger than the quota for sets of size two, but since
the quota for sets of size two is greater than the quota for sets of size 1, nothing guarantees that it
will be. To see how this might happen, let vl = v2 = v3k v and p12 = pI3 = p23 £ p. Then the
quota for sets of size one is
V-2S\ = 3(\-2T(p))v
and the quota for sets of size two is
2S\ = 67(p)v.
One player sets are winning in the first-best optimal mechanism if
v>V-2S\
which implies
Suppose so. Then for two-player sets
2v<6T(p)v
and so weak monotonicity violated. Incentive compatibility without weak monotonicity is
impossible.
C. Equicorrelation
Supppose that whenever / * k, pik - p. I call this condition equicorrelation. Note that if
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n = 2, equicorrelation must obtain. It is easy to show that if equicorrelation obtains,
(8) P ^ - ^ T
is a necessary condition for R to be positive definite. Since
n
(y) V/ = p £j Gk + ( 1 — p)CT/,
condition (8) assures v, > 0 if Ox = O2 = ...= On, but does not assure that v, > 0 if Q, is
particularly low and p is negative.
With equicorrelation, R^ is the same for all /: an («-l) x («-l) matrix with one's on the
main diagonal and p's off it. Consider a sety ={1,2,. . . , \J\}. For iej, Q^R.) is the probability
that all the members of/7/ will have nonnegative net benefits and all members of Nlj will have
negative net benefits. But since all correlations are the same, this is the same as the probability
that any set of size [/1 -1 will all have nonnegative net benefits and that its complement of size
(n- [/1) will all have negative benefits. Let n( \j | -1, n- \j \, p) denote this probability and in general
let n(y, x, p) denote the probability that when p is the correlation between any two players' net
benefits, a particular set of size y will all have nonnegative net benefits and a particular set of size







 iEJ- nQj\,n-[/lp) kij
To simplify this expression we need the following important lemma:
Lemma 1: Let x = (x{,..., xp), xl = (xk+l,..., xk+m) and x2 = (xk+m+l,..., xk+2m), where k+2m = n and
p < k. Let <b(x\xl>0, x2<0) denote the conditional probability of x givenxl>0 and x^O, and let
(()*(•) denote the marginal distribution of x. Then
Proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the distribution of a set of variables conditional on equal numbers of
other variables being positive and negative is the same as the marginal distribution of that set.
Roughly speaking, equal numbers of positive and negative variables cancel each other out.
Next, let
x 7t0H-l;c,p)
denote the probability that a particular player will have nonnegative net benefits given that a set
of size y has nonnegative net benefits and a set of size x has negative net benefits (neither of
these two sets including the player in question). By analogy
LetF= I
Then (10) can be rewritten
o i(|/|—l,/i—1/|—1,P)TC(—ll/|~l,w—[/|—l,p) y
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where we have used the relationship from lemma 1
n(\;\-l,n-\j\-l,p) n([j\-\,n-\j\-l,p)
l-2T(p) "
Thus whether a set/ is winning or not depends on the sign of the expression in brackets.
This is almost a weighted voting scheme with weights v,-, but the quota, in general, varies with
the size of the set. The exception is p = 0; then since n (+ \y, x, 0) = Vfe for all y and x, the quota
is always V/2.
It is easy to see that n (+|>>-1, n-y-l, p) is an increasing function ofy if p > 0 and a
decreasing function if p < 0. Let n be even (we will maintain this assumption throughout the
remainder of this section). Then TC(+| | - l , | - l , p ) = j for all p by lemma 1.
Let L(y) be the Lorenz curve tor the distribution of v/s. That is, L(y) = max/ 2 j , subject
iej
to [f\ = y. Figure 2 shows L(y) and n(+\y - 1 , n-y-l, p) graphed together (for p < 0).
The intersection of these two curves, y*, is the smallest size of a winning set. Clearly if p < 0,
y* < \and 7t(+|/ - \,n-y* - l,p) > \.
If v, is the same for all players /, then the L(y) curve becomes a straight line that goes.
through the point M- [j, \) , as shown in figure 3.
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Since A/is always on the 7t-curve, we can conclude that if v, is the same for all players i, majority
rule is the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 5: Suppose the set of issues is equicorrelated and v, is the same for all players. If the
set of issues is weakly monotonic, then majority rule represents the first-best optimal mechanism.
Proof: From (8) and (9), v, > 0. From (10) if \j\ = ^, S7 = 0. From weak monotonicity, then
I/I < \ implies S<0 and |/| > \ implies S}•> \ .
Weak monotonicity, however, is a real requirement if p is sufficiently large. Figure 4
illustrates the problem: if p is positive, and the 7i() curve could cross the L() curve several (an
odd number of) times:
As in the three-player case, the quota can rise faster than the sum of votes. The optimal
first-best mechanism in figure 4 has the issue being approved if the number of favorable votes is
either between^ and | , or more thany2. Such a mechanism is not incentive-compatible.
Note that in cases like figure 3 it is fairly easy to figure out optimal incentive-compatible
mechanisms. Since ( ? + x) favorable votes is just as probable an outcome as ( f - x ] favorable
votes, an optimal mechanism requires either^ favorable votes or>>2; the expected gain is the
same.
D. Two groups
An obvious and important extension of equicorrelation is to the case of two groups:
benefits are equicorrelated (presumable positively) within groups but independent between
groups. Examples could be people who live in the valley and people who live on the mountain,
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Sinhalese and Tamils, blacks and whites, Catholics and Protestants.
Let G and / /be two sets that form a partition of N, and let G* and H* respectively denote
their sizes. G*= | G | and //*= | H\, with G* < //*. Then p/Jfc = p^ if / and k both in G; pik = ph if /
and k both in //; and pik = 0 otherwise. Let Q, = 1 for all /; and so
Vj• = vg = 1 +p g G* -pg ifzsG
Vi = vh = 1+phH* -ph if/8//.
For any sety, Sj depends only on the number of G-type players in/, and the number of
//-type players in/. Let s(g, h) denote Sj when/ consists of g G-type players and h //-type




Assume weak monotonicity. Then the problem of finding a first-best optimal mechanism
is equivalent to finding the locus of s(g,h) = 0 in (g,h) space.
The first observation about this problem is that
G*
T '
always. This follows from double repetition of the reasoning of proposition 5. An issue that
loses with both groups always loses; an issue that wins with both groups always wins.
Next, we can show that if the groups are identical so that G*=H* and pg=p/,, majority rule
is the optimal mechanism. To do this, we need to show that for any x, — > x> 0,




and J ( ^ - J C , ^ + X ) =0 .
Finally, we can show that under certain circumstances minority votes should count for
more. Suppose G*<H* but that pg=pA=p. Consider the outcome where ( y- -x) type-g voters
vote yes and {Jj- +x) type-/* voters vote yes. Pure majority rule implies a tie. But we will
show:
for sufficiently large n: the optimal mechanism protects the minority.






Since TT(+|2X, 0) > | for JC>0, this expression is negative for sufficiently large
Notice that symmetry implies
whenever
Thus optimal mechanismcs do not merely protect minorities; sometimes, because of strong
minority support, they adopt a proposal a majority opposes.
E. Representative Government
Correlation opens up the possibility that representative government might work better
than majority rule. After all, none of the optimal mechanisms under conditional independence
were like representative government.
The following example illustrates this point. There are nine voters, three in each of three






- f - » - 1
The net benefits provided by issue B are the negatives of these net benefits.
Issue A provides positive social net benefits, and so should be approved; issue B should
be rejected. Only four players favor issue A, however, and so majority rule would reject it and
accept issue B ~ precisely the wrong outcome. Suppose, however, each constituency has a vote
and that vote is determined by majority rule within the constituency. Constituencies 1 and 2 will
support issue A, and so it will be accepted. Issue B will be rejected. So representative
government based on natural constituencies is optimal in this example; pure majority rule is not.
Note, though, that representative government with the constituencies I called "natural"
was optimal; representative government with other constituencies may be pretty bad. Consider
the constituencies described by the dotted lines in table 1. Representative government with these
constituencies would be completely wrong; it would reject issue A and accept issue B.
Generalizing these results ~ determining when representative government is better than
majority rule and what sort of partition into constituencies is optimal ~ appears to be difficult
mathematically. Since redistricting is frequently done now without appeal to any but the crudest
optimization criteria, further research in this area is likely to be productive.
V. Delineating Issues
Starting with a set of issues, the preceding sections have shown how to construct an
optimal mechanism for resolving them. These results are an important part of writing efficient
contracts and wise constitutions. But they are only part. The other part is delineating sets of
issues ~ determining, for instance, whether the same procedure will apply when a landowner
wants to build a gas station as when she wants to build a house.
How to delineate issues will be the subject of this section. First I will derive a general
38
result about decentralization ~ the more separate mechanisms the better. The second part will
apply this result to municipal governance, and the third will examine the problems of ambiguity
and encroachment.
A. Decentralization
In this section I will argue that if observable and verifiable differences among issues
exist, it is in general desirable to take advantage of those differences by designing different
mechanisms. This result is in some ways analogous to Milgrom's [1981] finding that optimal
compensation schemes in principal-agent problems take advantage of all available information.
Suppose that some observable and verifiable procedure can assign an issue either to set A
or set B. Let a denote the (ex ante) probability that an issue is in set A. Let z* denote an
optimal procedure for resolving an issue conditional on its being in set A, z5 an optimal
procedure for set B, and z the unconditionally optimal procedure. That is, z is an optimal
procedure for resolving an issue without knowing which set it belongs to.
Assume all of these procedures are first-best optimal. Then expected benefits under z, the
unconditionally optimal procedure, are less than or equal to expected benefits under z* and z8,
and will be strictly less whenever there is a "serious" difference between z^  and z8.
Proposition 6: Let z8 be the optimal mechanism for set of issues B that is closest in
Euclidian norm to z*. Then
S(z) < aS(zA) + (1 - a)S(zB)
with equality if and only if zA=zB.
Proof: Let Sf denote expected net social benefits given that an issue is in set A and
precisely the players in set j have nonnegative social benefits; similarly for Sf.
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Suppose rVz5. Then for some/, p>0 and Sfsf < 0 . (As the closest optimal
mechanism, zf can differ from zf only when Sf and Sf have different signs.) Assume w.l.o.g.
Sf > Oand Sf < 0; hence zf = 1 and zf = 0.
Consider
Sj = aSf+(l-a)Sf
There are three possibilities.
If S>0, then z/=l and so zyS, = oz/5y + (1 - a)Sf < (1 - a ) z ^ + (1 - a)zf 5f ,
since Sf < 0. If S,-<0, then z/=0 and so ZJSJ < azfsf + (1 - a)zf 5f , since 5^ > 0 and zf = 0. If
Sj=O, then zy5y = 0 < aafsf + (1 - a)zf 5f = azy5f . Similarly for Sf <0andSf>0 .
Since zy5y < azfsf + (1 - oi)zfsf for some/ with the reverse inequality for none,
ri7A(\A -t- T1 — r/l7-595^j j z/5f
= a 2/vz/5f + (1 - a)I.pjzfsf = aS(zA) + (1 - a)S(zB).
Now suppose z/*=zs. Then Sf and Sf have strongly opposite signs for no/ (although one
can be zero while the other is not). Hence Sj has the same sign as the nonzero one of Sf and Sf ,
and z = zf = zf is optimal; the equality follows.
QED
Proposition 6 is an argument for decentralization: people in Brooklyn should not be
voting about issues that Staten Island people care a lot more about; and vice versa. But
proposition 6 is about more than geographic decentralization. Everybody in Brooklyn may care
in some way both about Brooklyn sewers and Brooklyn street maintenance, but if the
distributions of noncontractible sewer and street maintenance net benefits are sufficiently
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different, sewer and street issues should be resolved differently.
B. Application to Municipal Governance
A simple example illustrates how these ideas can be used. Suppose there are three parks
-- Branch Brook, Ivy Hill, and Weequahic - and three people - Mr. B, Mr. I, and Mr. W.
Language is available to delineate issues into three sets: a set of issues for each park (for
instance, in the Weequahic set are issues like whether to install new swings in that park or to
move the basketball court), and a set of general issues (should a bucket truck for trimming trees
in all three parks be purchased?). Assume for now that each set of issues is conditionally
symmetric and conditionally independent.
For each person, let a{ denote expected net benefits in his own park, conditional on net
benefits being positive, and let a2 denote conditional expected net benefits in each of the other
two parks. Let ag denote conditional expected net benefits from general issues, the same for all
people.
The decentralization result, proposition 6, says that we should consider each indentifiable
set of issues separately. Since ag is the same for all people, majority rule is the optimal
mechanism for general issues. For each of the parks, majority rule is optimal iff
(13) al<2a2,
otherwise dictatorship by the person who cares most is optimal.
Thus a unified government — majority rule on all issues ~ is optimal if (13) holds; a
special district for general issues and local autonomy on specific park issues is optimal if (13)
does not hold. Notice that the question of unified government is a question about
noncontractible externalities ~ whether or not (13) holds ~ not a question about returns to scale,
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contractible or noncontractible. If the set of general issues had a positive midpoint rather than
being conditionally symmetrical, the optimal procedure for resolving general issues might
change ~ fewer affirmative votes would be required ~ but if (13) still did not hold, unified
government would still not be optimal.
C. Ambiguity and encroachment
Proposition 6 relies on observable and verifiable differences among issues that can be set
forth unambiguously. Sometimes this is not the case. A house is easy enough to distinguish
from a gas station, for instance, but do cousins, convents, and communes qualify as "families"
for a zone that is restricted to "one-family" houses?
If ambiguity is possible, proposition 6 does not always hold. The municipal governance
example lets us see why. A strong consequence of proposition 6 in that example was that as long
as some issues were general, some form of general government, either a unified government or a
special district, would be optimal. With enough ambiguity, this consequence fails.
Let all sets of issues be independent, not just conditionally independent, let y denote the
proportion of issues that are general, and let j (1- y) be the proportion of issues specific to each
park. Assume that (13) fails so that a special district is optimal in the absence of ambiguity.
Suppose that if a special district is set up, its mandate has to be written so poorly that it
will decide by majority rule not only all general issues, but a proportion p of the issues specific
to each park. The gain in setting up a special district rather than not deciding general issues at all
is | yag— the gain is 3ag if all three are for an issue, ag if two are for it, the probability of an
issue being general and all three being for it is |y, and the probability of an issue being general
and two being for it is fy. On the other hand the loss from having specific park issues decided
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by majority rule instead of appropriate dictatorship is
l
-p>(\-y)(al-2a2)
where (al~2a2) is the loss whenever an issue is decided wrongly (the appropriate dictator loses by
a 2-1 vote), \ is the probability of a wrong decision, and p(l-y) is the proportion of issues
susceptible to wrong decisions.
Then if
or
letting general issues go unresolved is better than establishing a special district that will meddle
in specific park business. Complete independence is more desirable the less important general
issues are (ag small), the less frequently they come up (y small), the greater the propensity to
meddle ( p large), and the smaller the noncontractible externalities ((ax-2a2) large).
Unlike the previous section, economies of scale can matter here; a positive midpoint for
general issues argues against letting them go unresolved. But economies of scale are an
argument in the presence of ambiguity for special districts rather than complete independence;
they are not an argument for unified government rather than special districts.
VI. Conclusion
Median voter models have long dominated economic discussion of political phenomena.
But these models have some severe drawbacks, both empirically and conceptually. Koford
[1994 ] argues cogently against the empirical applicability of the median voter model even to the
U.S. Congress (but see Poole and Rosenthal [1994 ] for an opposite position), and the conceptual
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weakness of the median voter model is obvious ~ why would anyone bother to have an election
when the outcome is so obvious that it could have been written into the constitution anyway?
Even more seriously, the median voter model says little or nothing about questions like
liberty, minority rights, representative government, and annexation. The approach I have tried in
this paper says a lot about these questions, and bases what it says on fundamental principles of
optimization and efficiency. These are, I think, serious arguments for using this approach.
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Appendix




But for any f, x1 given x2 =tum and x3 =-tum is distributed multivariate normal with mean vector
p(tum - tum) = 0 and variance-covariance matrix




(Johnson and Kotz, 1972). Hence
and so
The lemma follows immediately for any subvector of JC1.
QED
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